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NOTE
LOVE OR CONFUSION?
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE, HOMOSEXUALITY
AND THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT IN
SNETSINGER V. MONTANA UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
Cassie Coleman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Disregarding already-enacted statutory provisions' and
risking redundancy, on November 2, 2004, the majority of
Montana voters unnecessarily amended the Montana
Constitution to define marriage, limiting it to unions between
one man and one woman. 2
Disregarding the requests of the litigants before it, on
December 30, 2004, the Montana Supreme Court issued its
decision in Snetsinger v. Montana University System, 3
unnecessarily confusing the definition of "marriage" in Montana.
Barred from attaining any type of marriage in Montana, the
Petitioners in Snetsinger requested that the court determine
" J.D. 2005, University of Montana School of Law. This article was completed as part of
a Margery Hunter Brown Assistantship project.
1. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-103 (2003).
2- MONT CONST. art. XYT, R 7.
3. 2004 MT 390, 325 Mont. 148, 104 P.3d 445.
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their status as a class without altering Montana's marriage
definitions. Instead, the court confused the definition of
common-law marriage in Montana, which does not pertain to
the Petitioners, and failed to determine the litigants' status as a
class.
Although the majority's decision in Snetsinger is a small
victory for advocates of equal rights, the decision disserves all
parties to the litigation and the citizens of Montana as a whole.
First, the decision does not clarify the Petitioners' rights, which
they asked the court to do. Second, the decision confuses the
legal status of common-law marriage, especially for state,
federal and private entities, as well as individuals who rely upon
common-law marriage. The court would have better served the
litigants and Montana as a whole if it had determined the class
status of the Petitioners without handing down an opinion that
needlessly confuses the issue of common-law marriage-a
relationship the Petitioners are not even permitted to establish
in this state.
This case note first summarizes the multiple opinions in
Snetsinger, including the majority's holding, Justice Nelson's
concurrence, and the two dissenting opinions, one written by
Justice Rice and joined by Justice Warner, and the other
authored by Chief Justice Gray. This note then discusses why
the court should have established the Petitioners' class status,
as well as determined that classifications based on sexual
orientation should be analyzed under strict scrutiny. Next, this
note explains the problems and potential ramifications of the
majority's holding in Snetsinger, particularly for state, federal
and private entities that rely upon Affidavits of Common-Law
Marriage in making benefit determinations. Finally, this case
note suggests directions for legislation and litigation aimed at
establishing equal treatment of homosexuals.
II. THE FACTS AND OPINIONS
A. The Facts
Carol Snetsinger and Nancy Siegel, and Carla Grayson and
Adrianne Neff, employees of the Montana University System
and their same-sex partners, together with PRIDE, Inc., a non-
profit corporation (the Petitioners), brought suit against the
Vol. 66
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Montana University System, the Board of Regents and the
Commissioner of Higher Education on February 4, 2000.4 They
alleged that the University System's policy of allowing all
heterosexual employees to purchase dependent benefits, while
denying this same opportunity to all homosexual employees, was
unconstitutional as it "treats gay people as second-class citizens,
burdens their choices about how to structure their intimate
relationships, stigmatizes their families, and devalues them as
members of society."'5 The University System's policy permitted
employees to purchase insurance for their partners if they were
joined in a "solemnized marriage" under section 40-1-301 of the
Montana Code, were married using a Declaration of Marriage
without solemnization pursuant to section 40-1-311, or had
signed an Affidavit of Common-Law Marriage (the Affidavit).6
The Affidavit stated as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
We, the undersigned, both being over the age of 18 years, have
mutually consented and contracted to become husband and wife;
we are now, and have been since (date), living
together as husband and wife, and have mutually consented to
hold towards each other the relationship of husband and wife, and
to assume towards each other all the responsibilities and duties
which the law attached to such a relationship. 7
Signing the Affidavit allowed employees to purchase health
insurance benefits through the University System's group plan
for whoever signed the Affidavit with the University employee.
8
The University System permitted only heterosexual couples to
sign the Affidavit, stating the policy was based on Montana's
marriage statutes.9 The Petitioners argued the policy was
unconstitutional in that it permitted unmarried heterosexual
couples to obtain health insurance benefits for their partners,
while denying this same opportunity to all similarly situated
homosexual employees. 10 The Petitioners requested that the
court analyze the University System's policy under strict
scrutiny either by granting them suspect class status, or by
determining classifications based on sexual orientation are, in
4. Appellants' Opening Brief at 1, Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 2004 MT 390,
325 Mont. 148, 104 P.3d 445 (No. 03-238).
5. Id.
6. Snetsinger, 22.
7. Id. 123 (Rice, J., dissenting).
8. Id. 6.
9. Id. 21.
10. Appellants' Opening Brief at 5, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
2005 447
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all reality, actually based on sex, which is currently a suspect
class in Montana.11 At the very least, the Petitioners argued the
University System's policy of determining dependents for
insurance purposes failed to pass even rational basis review, the
lowest level of scrutiny. 12
In creating its employee benefits plan, the University
System could have provided benefits for any dependents or
limited the number of eligible dependents based on any number
of criteria. "Among these many options, Respondents chose
eligibility to marry as the dividing line, defining eligibility for
benefits in sex-based terms."'13 In objecting to the University
System's employee benefits plan, the Petitioners never argued
that Snetsinger was about marriage. Instead, they argued it
was "about equality in employment."'14 Further, the Petitioners
expressly stated: "This lawsuit only asks the Court to determine
whether Respondents have a compelling reason for using the
sex-based definition of marriage to determine eligibility for
benefits."'15 They also argued the University System's policy
violated the dignity clause contained in article II, section 4 of
the Montana Constitution, in that the policy punished
University employees who had same-sex domestic partners
because it "devalu[ed] their contributions to society, treat[ed]
them as second-class citizens, and undermin[ed] their ability to
maintain their family relationships, to provide responsibly for
their families and to live self-directed lives."'16
In response, the University System argued that sexual
orientation has not been defined as a suspect class by either the
Montana Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court, and that
the court should avoid making such a determination in the
Snetsinger case. 17 It further argued the Petitioners did not have
a fundamental right to health insurance and that the policy was
designed to give effect to all recognized forms of marriage in
11. Id. at 14-17.
12. Id. at 26-33. Where a policy or law implicates a fundamental right, the court
must apply strict scrutiny to determine whether classifications discriminating on such a
basis are constitutional, and the proponents of such law or policy must establish a
compelling state interest for the classification. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont
287, 298-99, 911 P.2d 1165, 1171-72 (1996).
13. Appellants' Opening Brief at 11, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 11 n.4.
16. Id. at 39.
17. Respondents' Brief at 4-6, Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 2004 MT 390, 325
Mont. 148, 104 P.3d 445 (No. 03-238).
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4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 66 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/5
LOVE OR CONFUSION?
Montana; in -effect, a permissible, reasonable and rational
classification.1 8  The University System argued, "[w]hile
homosexuals are no doubt the recipients of some degree of
discrimination, this is not enough to justify a designation of a
suspect class." 19 Granting suspect class status to homosexuals,
the University System alleged, "will have ramifications far
beyond this case and will cast doubt upon the constitutionality
of numerous statutes that may have a secondary or unintended
effect of excluding homosexuals from some benefit or type of
protection. '20 v
The University System argued its policy did not
discriminate based on sex because both men and women are
equally discriminated against and that the homosexual
petitioners "are capable of marrying. They just may not marry a
person of their own sex."21 The University System asserted the
policy was based on marriage, in that signing an Affidavit of
Common-Law Marriage created a presumption of marriage that
Montana recognized. 22 The University System further reasoned
that because the policy discriminated based on marital status,
same-sex and different-sex couples were not legally similarly
situated because the heterosexual couple signing the Affidavit
was validly married, a relationship the legislature has
specifically barred homosexual couples from establishing. 23 The
University System argued its reliance "on the state marriage
statute [was] inherently rational and [was] consistent with the
state's concept of marriage as expressed in state law."24 Finally,
the Appellants stated the court should not consider the
University System's motive because the case presented a public
policy question that should be left to the political process.25
The Petitioners disagreed with the University System's
public policy argument, stating in their reply brief, "[t]he
judiciary's role in protecting constitutional rights becomes all
the more crucial when the rights of minorities are involved
because it is far more difficult to protect their interests through
18. Id. at 7, 19.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 19
22. Id. at 27.
23. Resnmndpnts' Brief ist. 27, , not.sing' ( 0No .9.)
- , ..... ... g- - 03 238.. .
24. Id. at 35.
25. Id. at 36-40.
2005
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majoritarian political processes." 26
B. The Majority's Holding
In a four to three majority opinion authored by Justice
Regnier, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the district
court's dismissal of the suit.27 The court held the Affidavit did
not create a marriage for those couples who signed it, and
therefore, the University System's benefits policy
unconstitutionally discriminated based on sexual orientation,
not marital status.28 The majority held the Affidavit, at most,
constituted evidence of a common-law marriage in the event
such a union was contested.29 The court further held its own
precedent regarding common-law marriage consistently required
extrinsic evidence to prove such a relationship: "[O]ur case law
has required more than a signing of a piece of paper to establish
a common law marriage. 30
The majority maintained its decision did not change
common-law marriage, but rather, "reiterat[ed] and reaffirm[ed]
existing common law marriage jurisprudence." 31 The majority
went on to hold in the Petitioners' favor: "[A]ny organization
that adopts an administrative procedure in order to provide
employment benefits to opposite-sex partners who may not be in
a legal marital relationship, must do the same for same-sex
couples. To not do so violates equal protection."32
The majority reasoned that the University System's
affidavit procedure violated equal protection because signing the
Affidavit did not constitute a marriage as defined by Montana
marriage laws. 33 However, the court also clearly held that its
decision did not address same-sex marriage:
Lest there be any doubt, the Appellants clearly stated, both in
their brief and in oral argument, that they are not challenging
Montana's marriage laws which provide marriage is available only
to partners of the opposite sex .... Therefore, we have not been
26. Appellants' Reply Brief at 2, Snetsinger (No. 03-238) (citing Gryczan v. State,
283 Mont. 433, 455, 942 P.2d 112, 125 (1997)).
27. Snetsinger, $ 27. Justice Cotter, Justice Leaphart and Justice Nelson also
concurred in the majority opinion.
28. Id. 9 27.
29. Id. T 33.
30. Id. 99 32-33.
31. Id. 9 35-36.
32. Id. 35.
33. Snetsinger, $ 27.
450 Vol. 66
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asked nor will we address the question of whether Montana's
marriage statutes discriminate against same-sex couples by
denying them the right to marry. 34
Because the main issue litigated in Snetsinger involved the
Affidavit used by the University System, the court analyzed
whether the Affidavit sufficiently established a valid marriage
pursuant to Montana's marriage laws. The court examined
common-law marriage in Montana, finding it to be "an equitable
doctrine used to ensure people are treated fairly once a
relationship ends. '3 5 Following its own precedent on the issue,
the court held three elements must be present to establish a
common-law marriage. The couple must show that it: "1) is
competent to enter into a marriage, 2) mutually consents and
agrees to a common-law marriage, and 3) cohabits and is
reputed in the community to be husband and wife. '3 6
The court stated that it has generally applied the doctrine of
common-law marriage upon the termination of a relationship to
ensure the parties receive fair treatment, and that such a
marriage must be established through the presentation of
extrinsic evidence showing all elements of a common-law
marriage simultaneously existed during the relationship.37 The
majority held that where, as with the University System's
policy, the only evidence of a common-law marriage is a signed
affidavit, a marriage is not created. The majority further
reasoned that a policy allowing unmarried opposite-sex couples
to sign an Affidavit of Common-Law Marriage when they may
not be able to legally establish such relationships detracts from
marriage rather than promotes it.3s "Those opposite-sex couples
who fill out the Affidavit in order to receive benefits may be
shocked to think that they have in fact entered into a marriage
that requires court action to dissolve . . . ."39 The Snetsinger
majority's reasoning is consistent with the court's 1975 decision
in Matter of Estate of McClelland, where it declined to find the
existence of a valid common-law marriage, even though the
couple had signed an Affidavit of Common-Law Marriage,
because the totality of the evidence failed to show the existence
34. Id. 13.
35. Id. 24.
36. Id. (citingIn re Ober, 2003 MT 7, 9,314 Mont. 20, 9, 62 P.3d 1114, 9).
37. .
38. Id.
39. Snetsinger, 33.
2005
7
Coleman: Snetsinger v. Montana University System
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2005
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
of a marriage. 40
As signing an affidavit does not create a marriage, but
merely constitutes evidence of a marriage, the Snetsinger Court
found marital status was not the discriminating factor in
determining eligibility for benefits. Rather, the discrimination
resulted from the University System's disparate treatment of
same-sex and opposite-sex couples through its use of the
Affidavit. The court reasoned a partner of a heterosexual
employee would qualify for benefits by signing the Affidavit,
while the partner of a lesbian or gay employee signing the same
document would not qualify.41 Finally, the court applied the
lowest level of scrutiny, the rational basis test, to the policy and
found the Affidavit process served no legitimate governmental
purpose and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Montana Constitution. 42 The majority reasoned:
These two groups, although similarly situated in all respects other
than sexual orientation, are not treated equally and fairly. The
principal purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, Article II,
Section 4, of the Montana Constitution, is to ensure citizens are
not subject to arbitrary and discriminatory state action. Therefore,
we conclude there is no justification for treating the two groups
differently, nor is the University System's policy rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest. Once the illusory marital
status is removed from the analysis, there is no legitimate
governmental interest in treating the two groups differently.
43
Ultimately, the court declined to address whether the
University System based its policy on sex and failed to clarify
the Petitioners' status with regard to equal protection analysis.
44
D. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Rice's dissent, joined by Justice Warner, argued the
majority "radically alter[ed] common law marriage in Montana,
and fail[ed] to honor the reliance that many couples place in the
law."45 The dissent further argued that the majority's decision
included certain procedural errors in the way they handed down
the decision. 46 Disagreeing with the majority's assertion that its
decision did not alter common-law marriage in Montana, Justice
40. Id. 9 25-26.
41. Id. 26.
42. Id. 27.
43. Id.
44. Id. 29.
45. Snetsinger, 112 (Rice, J. dissenting).
46. Id. 113-161 (Rice, J., dissenting).
Vol. 66452
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Rice's dissent recognized the majority's problematic decision as
it pertains to state, federal and private entities that rely on
Affidavits of Common-Law Marriage.
The Court's error is further demonstrated by the practical realities
of proving a common-law marriage. State, federal and private
agencies routinely recognize common-law marriages by
administrative declaration, and pay financial benefits based upon
that administrative action. By law and by contract, these agencies
defer to the law of the applicant's domiciliary state in regard to the
validity and establishment of a common-law marriage. This is
particularly true of federal law governing eligibility for various
federal benefits. 47
Justice Rice argued the "extrinsic evidence" rule developed
by the majority had no basis in Montana law and, "as a practical
matter, will interfere with efforts of various agencies, applying
Montana law, to make common-law marriage determinations."4
He also argued, as did several amici, that the court should
uphold "traditional marriage."49 'Marriage between a man and
a woman is based upon thousands of years of cultural
experience. Its legal status is founded upon hundreds of years of
legal precedent."50 Justice Rice further reasoned that even if the
University System's policy discriminates, the newly enacted
Marriage Amendment permits such discrimination. 51
Chief Justice Gray wrote a separate dissent arguing that
reliance on affidavits makes for sound public policy because
these documents provide sufficient evidence to presume a
marital relationship consistent with Montana's common-law
marriage statute. 52 In addition, Justice Gray stated "there is
nothing 'illusory' about the marital versus non-marital nature of
the University System's policy.153  Couples who signed the
Affidavit are presumed to be in a valid marriage, Justice Gray
argued, even though it excluded same-sex couples, because
Montana does not recognize same-sex marriage, common-law or
otherwise. 54
47. Id. 133 (Rice, J., dissenting).
48. Id. 136 (Rice, J., dissenting).
49. Snetsinger, 150 (Rice, J., dissenting). See also Amicus Curiae Brief of the
Montana Catholic Conference, Snetsinger (No. 03-238) and Amicus Curiae Brief of
National Legal Foundation, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
50. Snetsinger, 150 (Rice, J., dissenting).
51. Id. 153 (Rice, J., dissenting).
52. Id. 171 (Gray, C.J., disenting).
53. Id. 174 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. $$ 166-78 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
2005 453
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E. Concurring Opinion
Justice Nelson wrote a concurring opinion joined by no other
members of the court in which he asserted that advocates for
equal rights should base their arguments on an expanded view
of the Montana Constitution's underutilized Equal Protection
Clause. 55 Justice Nelson argued laws and policies dependent on
gender or sexual orientation violate the Dignity Clause
contained in article II, section 4 of the Montana Constitution,
and that classifications based on gender or sexual orientation
are suspect. As a matter of Montana constitutional law, Justice
Nelson asserted that laws and policies based on gender or sexual
orientation should be subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the
showing of a compelling state interest for such classification. 56
According to Justice Nelson, under this type of analysis, the
University System's policy would fail.57
Justice Nelson determined homosexuals should be treated
as a suspect class because "[i]t is overwhelmingly clear that gays
and lesbians have been historically subject to unequal treatment
and invidious discrimination,"58 and that "homosexuals are still
among the most stigmatized groups in the nation."59 Justice
Nelson recognized and dismissed the fact that neither federal
nor state court jurisprudence has found sexual orientation as an
arbitrary classification or a "suspect class" for equal protection
purposes .60
This view, however popular, is inherently illogical when one
acknowledges that the entire focus of laws directed at gays and
lesbians is sex. Majoritarian morality and prevailing political
ideology are offended by the fact that people of the same sex have
sexual relations with each other. This offense translates into laws
and policies that explicitly or implicitly demonize homosexuals
and make them a disfavored class. Heterosexuals, on the other
hand, are a favored class because their sexual relations are with
persons of the opposite sex. Homosexuals are a disfavored class
because their sexual relations are with persons of the same sex.
Regardless, however, the defining criteria of either class is plainly
and simply sex-or, to be more specific, with which sex one is
55. Id. 7 66, 70 (Nelson, J., concurring).
56. Snetsinger, 43-110 (Nelson, J., concurring).
57. Id. 109 (Nelson, J., concurring).
58. Id. 45 (Nelson, J., concurring).
59. Id. 50 (Nelson, J., concurring) (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Fact Sheet:
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Issues (Feb. 2000)).
60. Id. 82 (Nelson, J., concurring).
454 Vol. 66
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having sex.
61
Justice Nelson further reasoned that no compelling state
interest existed for denying the same benefits to employees with
same-sex partners who were similarly situated to employees
with opposite-sex partners.62
III. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUES RAISED
BY THE LITIGANTS AND DETERMINED HOMOSEXUALS CONSTITUTE
A SUSPECT CLASS REQUIRING APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY
ANALYSIS
Although consistent with Montana precedent, the
limitations of the Snetsinger decision unnecessarily confuse
common-law marriage without defining the Petitioners' class
status. The majority's holding that merely signing an Affidavit
of Common-Law Marriage does not create a marriage, but
constitutes evidence weighing in favor of the finding of a
common-law marriage, consistently follows Montana common-
law marriage precedent. However, this holding inadequately
addresses the issues raised by the litigants. Snetsinger was not
a common-law marriage case, as the Petitioners were not
married and did not allege to be in common-law marriages. 63
Unlike common-law marriage cases, the court was not presented
with various facts supporting or detracting from finding such a
relationship. Thus, without any facts regarding common-law
marriage, the court abolished the constitutional use of Affidavits
of Common-Law Marriage.
As the Montana Supreme Court and the federal courts have
done in the past, the court applied the lowest level of scrutiny,
rational basis review, to the University System's affidavit
procedure and concluded that no rational basis permitted
heterosexuals to sign the Affidavit and obtain benefits while
preventing similarly situated homosexuals from obtaining the
same benefits. 64 Prior use of this lowest level of scrutiny does
not suggest that classifications based on sexual orientation are
not subject to a higher level of scrutiny; it merely indicates the
policies and laws at issue in prior litigation involving
discrimination based on sexual orientation have been so
egregious so as not to even pass the lowest level of scrutiny.
61. Id. (Nelson, J., concurring).
6 2. Sne---singer, '1-1 101-02 k-esn J., culluurrillg).
63. Appellants' Opening Brief at 4, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
64. Snetsinger, 27.
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Therefore, courts have found it unnecessary to analyze the
policies and laws at a level more stringent than rational basis.65
The Snetsinger court's decision not to apply a higher level of
scrutiny resulted in unnecessary confusion of common-law
marriage and leaves federal, state and private entities at a loss
regarding how to determine the distribution of benefits when
faced with a potential common-law marriage. The court created
this confusion despite the fact that the litigants clearly stated
the case was not about, marriage.66 Snetsinger was not a case
about marriage because, as the court found, the Affidavit
procedure did not create a marriage or constitute enough
evidence by itself to create a presumption of marriage. Rather,
the case involved illegal discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The court should have ruled on the issue presented
by the Petitioners and addressed the discrimination at issue in
the litigation.
A. The Litigants Requested the Court Address the Class Status
of Homosexuals, Not Rule on the Issue of Common-Law Marriage
The major problem with the Snetsinger holding is that none
of the litigants asked the court to muddy the waters of common-
law marriage. In fact, the Petitioners repeatedly stated, as the
majority admits, that the case was not about same-sex
marriage. 67 As the majority opinion should have reflected,
Snetsinger dealt with the legal status of same-sex couples in
Montana. The Petitioners clearly described this aspect of the
case in their reply brief.
[T]he question whether gay people constitute a suspect class
deserving of heightened scrutiny must be addressed by applying
the established legal test. This court's role, as Respondents
emphasize elsewhere in their brief, is not to legislate or to make
decisions based solely on policy considerations, but to apply
established constitutional law to the facts before it.68
Although the court may fashion any appropriate remedy it
deems necessary, 69 and in fact litigants as a matter of course
65. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont.
433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997).
66. Appellants' Opening Brief at 4, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
67. Snetsinger, 13. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 4, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
68. Appellants' Reply Brief at 14, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
69. Goodover v. Lindey's, Inc., 246 Mont. 80, 82, 802 P.2d 1258, 1260 (1990). "In
fashioning the remedy, the court is not bound by the relief requested in the complaint
but may order any relief needed to effectuate the judgment."
456 Vol. 66
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expressly plead for "any other relief this Court deems just,"
courts should decide the case before it. Determination of class
status under an equal protection analysis was the issue before
the court, and it was the issue the court should have addressed.
Montanans should not have their lives drastically altered and
the status of their relationships completely changed by litigants
who have repeatedly argued their case on other grounds. As
Justice Rice stated in his dissent, the court should not have
made any decisions regarding common-law marriage. 70 Only
Justice Nelson addressed the issue before the court, but did so in
a strongly-opinionated concurrence that remains only persuasive
precedent.71
In the last decade, both the Montana Supreme Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court have skirted classifying homosexuals as
a suspect class subject to strict scrutiny.72 The issue is ripe for
determination and repeatedly being placed before courts by
litigants across the country.73 Snetsinger presented a perfect
opportunity for the court to determine the class status of
homosexuals and the applicable level of scrutiny in analyzing
laws and policies that classify people based on sexual
orientation. As homosexuals meet all the requirements of a
suspect class, they should be entitled to its legal classification as
such, requiring the application of strict scrutiny analysis to all
laws and policies based on such a classification. Even without
granting homosexuals suspect class status, strict scrutiny
analysis should have been applied because, as with all
classifications based on sexual orientation, the University
System's policy actually discriminated based on sex, a currently-
existing suspect class under Montana law.
B. The Court Should have Granted Homosexuals Suspect Class
Status
The test for determining suspect class status is whether the
class of people is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
70. Snetsinger, 113 (Rice, J., dissenting).
71. Id. 38-111 (Nelson, J., concurring).
72. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558;
Roomier~~~~~ v.j~ul Evn,'.7US .20(99)orea, uaL. 433, 942 .2 1c 2t.
73. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. 186; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Romer, 517 U.S. 620;
Gryczan, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112.
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such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." 74  It can hardly be disputed that homosexuals have
been "saddled with" societal disabilities, "subjected to purposeful
unequal treatment," and "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness."7 5 The Snetsinger litigants did not dispute the
extensive history of purposeful discrimination against
homosexuals, or that sexual orientation is completely unrelated
to employee performance.7 6
Opponents of equal rights for homosexuals have often
argued that immutability of the distinguishing characteristic is
a necessary requirement to obtain suspect class status. 77 This
characterization is inaccurate because alienage and religious
affiliation are not immutable, yet both have triggered strict
scrutiny. 78 Further, even if the court did require immutability,
this element would be satisfied because there is no evidence
sexual orientation can be altered.79
As amici Montana Human Rights Network argued,
homosexuals meet all the necessary elements for suspect class
status because gays and lesbians have continually been
oppressed based on myths that in comparison to heterosexuals,
they contribute less and cause detriment to society.80 Like other
classes of people who have obtained suspect class status such as
women and racial minorities, homosexuals have historically
been subjected to such a degree of unequal treatment so as to
warrant classification as a suspect class.8' For example, the
United States denied admission to homosexual aliens until 1965
74. In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 33, 951 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1997) (citing San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216
n.14 (1982)).
75. In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 33, 951 P.2d at 1371.
76. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 22, Snetsinger (No. 03-328) (stating
homosexuals "historically have been subjected both to legal disabilities and to
discrimination and violence .... "); Respondents' Brief at 6, Snetsinger (No. 03-328)
(stating "homosexuals are no doubt the recipients of some degree of discrimination ...
.'1).
77. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief Montana Human Rights Network, et. al. at 4 n.4,
Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing U.S. Surgeon General, The Surgeon General's Call to Action to
Promote Sexual Health and Responsible Sexual Behavior (July 9, 2001) ('There's no valid
scientific evidence that sexual orientation can be changed.")).
80. Amici Curiae Brief Montana Human Rights Network, et. al. at 5-7, Snetsinger
(No. 03-238).
81. Id.at7-11.
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based on their status as "psychopaths."8 2  Homosexuals have
repeatedly been discriminated against in employment and
continue to be discriminated against by the U.S. Department of
Defense.8 3
Homosexuals are specifically deterred from political
activism because "coming out" can detrimentally effect future
and continued employment and poses a greater risk of physical
violence.8 4 In 1973, when the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
that gender classifications should warrant heightened scrutiny,
fourteen women were serving in the U.S. House of
Representatives.8 5 In 2002, three homosexuals served in the
House.8 6 The Senate has never had an openly homosexual
member.8 7  Montana statutorily defined same-sex sexual
relations as criminal acts until only recently.88 Even today, a
statute criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct remains codified
in the Montana Code even though it was found unconstitutional
by the Montana Supreme Court.8 9 The political powerlessness of
homosexuals can also be seen in Montana's recently enacted
amendment to the state constitution, which reiterates the state's
statutory prohibition on same-sex marriage. 90
The repeated failure of the political process to serve
homosexuals can be seen throughout the Montana Code in the
sheer number of statutes specifically relating to the marital
institution which excludes homosexuals. In its brief supporting
the University System's position, the leadership of the 58th
Montana Legislature wrote: "Overall, 539 provisions of the
Montana Code contain the words 'marriage,' 'spouse,' 'husband,'
or 'wife."' 91
In addition, the political process continues to fail
homosexuals, depriving them of protection as well as civil rights
82. Id. at 8. This law was enacted at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).
83. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
84. Amici Curiae Brief Montana Human Rights Network, et. al. at 8-9, Snetsinger
(No. 03-328).
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Gryczan, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112.
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(20) (2004); Gryzcan, 283 Mont. at 456, 942 P.2d
at 126.
90. MONT. CONST. art. XIIT. § 7; MONT. CODE. ANN & A41103 (2001).
91. Amici Curiae Brief The Honorable Roy Brown, et. al. at 5, Snetsinger (No. 03-
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as demonstrated by the 2005 Montana legislative session.92
Despite the numerous instances of violence directed at
homosexuals, the legislature declined to extend Montana's hate
crimes statute to include offenses against homosexuals.93 In his
concurrence, Justice Nelson cited the following assertions from
the American Psychiatric Association:
[W]hen compared to other social groups, homosexuals are still
among the most stigmatized groups in the nation. Hate crimes are
prevalent. Gay men and lesbians are still banned from serving
openly in the U.S. military service. Child custody decisions still
frequently view gay and lesbian people as unfit parents. Gay and
lesbian adolescents are often taunted and humiliated in their
school settings. Many professional persons and employees in all
occupations are still fearful of identifying as gay or lesbians in
their work settings. Gay relationships are not recognized in any
legal way.94
There is no way to view this blatantly discriminatory
treatment without recognizing that it "saddles" those treated in
such a manner with myriad societal disabilities such as fear of
violence, losing custody of their children, or losing a job.95
Further, such treatment certainly constitutes "a history of
purposeful unequal treatment" justifying treatment as a suspect
class. 96 Homosexuals meet all requirements necessary for this
classification and courts should apply strict scrutiny when
analyzing any laws or policies that discriminate based on sexual
orientation.
C. Equal Protection Analysis
The first step in analyzing challenges under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution is to determine if
the classes involved are similarly situated.97 If the classes are in
fact similarly situated, the second part of the analysis is to
determine whether the law or policy at issue treats the classes
92. Alison Farrell, Legislature Kills All Human Rights Bills, MISSOULIAN, April 18,
2005 at 1.
93. S.B. 202, 2005 Leg., 59th Sess. (Mont. 2005).
94. Snetsinger, 1 50 (Nelson, J., concurring) (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Fact
Sheet: Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Issues (Feb. 2000)).
95. See generally Amici Curiae Brief Montana Human Rights Network, et al.,
Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
96. In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 32, 951 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1997).
97. Henry v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 1999 MT 126, 27, 294 Mont. 449, 27, 982
P.2d 456, 27.
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differently.98 Even if the classification appears neutral as to the
treatment of the class, it may be challenged if it is actually "a
devise designed to impose different burdens on different classes
of persons."99
In Snetsinger, employees with partners eligible for health
insurance benefits were similarly situated to employees with
partners who were denied those same benefits. As the
Petitioners argued:
Unmarried female employees of the University living with female
domestic partners are similarly situated in relation to unmarried
male employees who live with female domestic partners. Though
they are in identical positions, male employees may obtain health
benefits for their female partners, to whom they are not married,
simply by signing an 'Affidavit of Common-Law Marriage.' The
University System does not permit Plaintiffs to do the same. As
long as a female employee lives with a female partner she is
denied this benefit of her employment while her male co-worker
living with his female partner is not. 100
Once the court determines the two groups receiving unequal
treatment. are similarly situated, it must then determine
whether the class of people discriminated against by the policy
or law qualifies as a suspect class. 10 1 Although the class status
of homosexuals has recently been an issue before the Montana
and U.S. Supreme Courts, neither has determined the class
standing of homosexuals or the level of scrutiny that must be
applied when analyzing laws and policies that discriminate
based on sexual orientation. In Gryczan v. State and Lawrence
v. Texas, the Montana Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme
Court, respectively, determined that statutes criminalizing
sexual conduct between people of the same sex violated
constitutionally protected rights. 10 2 The courts in both cases
applied rational basis review. 0 3  Neither court, however,
addressed the class status for homosexuals because the laws at
issue involved such egregious discrimination that they could not
even withstand rational basis review. 0 4 Rather, the courts
determined the laws at issue interfered with the constitutionally
98. Appellants' Opening Brief at 8-9, Snetsinger (No. 03-328).
99. State v. Spina, 1999 MT 113, 85, 294 Mont. 367, 85, 982 P.2d 421, 85.
100. Amicus Curiae Brief Northwest Women's Law Center at 11, Snetsinger (No.
03-238).
101. Henry, 29.
102. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Gryzcan, 283 Mont. 433. 942 P.2d 112.
103. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Gryzcan, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112.
104. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Gryzcan, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112.
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protected rights of privacy and liberty.10 5 Despite the fact that
both the Montana and U.S. Supreme Courts have held
unconstitutional laws discriminating against homosexuals, the
courts should nonetheless find homosexuals a suspect class
because, as previously discussed, they meet all of the suspect
class qualifications.
IV. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT
SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS REALLY SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION
Even if the court declined to recognize homosexuals as a
suspect class based upon the history of discrimination against
them, it should have analyzed the University System's health
insurance benefit policy under strict scrutiny since
discrimination based on sexual orientation is in reality based on
a person's sex, a suspect class in Montana. 10 6 Montana applies
strict scrutiny when analyzing classifications based on sex
because freedom from discrimination due to one's sex is a
fundamental right guaranteed by article II, section 4 of the
Montana Constitution, which expressly provides: "Neither the
state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall
discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or
political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social
origin or condition, or political or religious ideas." 107
The policy at issue in Snetsinger constituted sex
discrimination because the sole factor in the University System's
determination of whether to extend health insurance benefits to
an employee's partner was the gender of the employee and that
of his or her partner seeking benefits.108 As previously noted,
"[als long as a female employee lives with a female partner she
is denied this benefit of her employment while her male co-
worker living with his female partner is not."10 9 The Petitioners
further argued:
A policy that conditions access to employment benefits on the sex
of an employee and his or her partner is sex discrimination.
Respondents offer benefits to a male employee with a female
105. Lawrence, 539 U. S. at 578-79; Gryzcan, 283 Mont. at 447-56, 942 P.2d at 120-
26.
106. Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. at 299, 911 P.2d at 1172.
107. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
108. Amici Curiae Brief Montana Human Rights Network, et al. at 1 n.2, Snetsinger
(No. 03-238).
109. Amicus Curiae Brief Northwest Women's Law Center at 11, Snetsinger (No.
03-238); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
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partner but not to a female employee with a female partner. The
only difference between the first employee and the second is the
sex of that employee.
110
Montana Human Rights Network asserted a similar argument
in its brief. "If a male employee has a male partner, the partner
cannot receive benefits. If he has a female partner, benefits can
be received merely by signing an Affidavit. Thus, the gender of
the employee and of the partner is the sole factor in determining
whether benefits are available." '111
The University System argued its policy did not involve sex
discrimination because it applied equally to men and women.
112
This same argument failed in Loving v. Virginia, where the U.S.
Supreme Court held that statutory prohibitions on interracial
marriage are unconstitutional. 113 In that case, the Court did not
accept the State's argument that anti-miscegenation laws did
not discriminate because they applied to blacks and whites
equally. 114
[W]e reject the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute
containing racial classifications is enough to remove the
classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of
all invidious racial discriminations, we do not accept the State's
contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is any
possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose.
115
The University System supplied a similar argument, stating
that the policy discriminates equally against both genders
because a man cannot marry a man and a woman cannot marry
a woman. 116 As the Petitioners noted, however, "denial of
employment benefits to a gay person in a committed
relationship with a same-sex partner classifies individuals
according to sex."117 In Loving, the Court found this type of
rationale violated the constitutional right to equal protection
and held it unnecessary to show two groups are discriminated
against differently; it is sufficient to show the statute or policy
discriminates based on a protected classification. 118
110. Appellants' Reply Brief at 2, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
111. Amici Curiae Brief Montana Human Rights Network, et al. at 1 n.2, Snetsinger
(No. 03-238).
112. Respondents' Brief at 17-19, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
113. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
114. Id. at 7-8; see McLaughlin v. Fla., 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
115. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
1.16. R.pnndPnt._' Rripf qt 17-19 netsinger (Nn. 0.2.29)_
117. Appellants' Reply Brief at 2, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
118. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8-9.
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Discrimination based on the sex of a person and that of his
or her partner creates a sex-based classification for equal
protection purposes, just as discrimination based on race created
a race-based classification in Loving. Since the University
System discriminated by using a classification system based on
sex, and freedom from such discrimination is a fundamental
right, 119 the court should have applied strict scrutiny analysis to
determine the constitutionality of the University System's
policy.
V. THERE Is No COMPELLING STATE INTEREST FOR THE
DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS
All statutes and policies that implicate a fundamental right
must be analyzed under strict scrutiny and can survive only if
the evidence shows the "action is closely tailored" to achieve a
compelling state interest "and is the least onerous path that can
be taken to achieve the State's objective."'120 Once the court
determines strict scrutiny analysis applies, the policy or law at
issue may still be found constitutional if a compelling state
interest exists for such a law or policy. 12'
The University System failed to establish even a rational
basis for its dependent benefits policy, and amici supporting the
University System's position only presented the argument that
the policy should be upheld because it promotes traditional
marriage. 22 As the Petitioners asserted in their opening brief,
"[i]t is hard to imagine how denying equal benefits to gay
employees and their life partners promotes any state interest at
all, much less a legitimate one."' 23  Indeed, the Affidavit
procedure, along with the policy of determining health insurance
benefits, privileges heterosexuality for its own sake. The court
determined the University's discriminatory policy failed to pass
the lowest level of scrutiny because no rational basis existed for
the policy's discriminatory determination of benefit eligibility. 24
Consequently, the court declined to apply strict scrutiny and did
119. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
120. MEIC v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, 63, 296 Mont. 207, 63, 988
P.2d 1236, 63.
121. Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 298-99, 911 P.2d at 1171-72.
122. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief Montana Catholic Conference, Snetsinger (No.
03-238); Amicus Curiae Brief National Legal Foundation, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
123. Appellants' Opening Brief at 7, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
124. Snetsinger, 19, 27.
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not address whether a compelling state interest existed. 125 As
the policy did not pass rational basis review, it would not have
withstood strict scrutiny analysis as no plausible compelling
state interest for the University's discriminatory employee
benefits policy exists.
Further, promoting heterosexism is not a compelling state
interest, contrary to the arguments made by amici supporting
the University System's policy.' 26  The University System
argued its benefits policy was based upon the epitome of
heterosexuality-the institution of marriage. 127 ...
In our culture, maintaining the institution of heterosexual
marriage is a crucial component of the preservation both of
heterosexual identity and heterosexual privilege, just as separate
schools are crucial to white identity and privilege ... By reserving
the ideal represented by marriage for itself, the heterosexual
majority is attempting to define itself by reference to this lodestar:
to be married is to be an adult, to accept commitment, to pledge
oneself to fidelity and loyalty and devotion. It is to be part of
society's most sacred institution and its traditional unit of
procreation. 128
Although use of an Affidavit provides a logical way to
determine benefits, the argument that the institution of
marriage must remain in its present state ignores the fact that
allowing the Affidavit to create a marriage may actually
cheapen it by providing the potential for heterosexuals to receive
benefits for a person with whom they may have no connection.
Justice Rice points out in his dissent that there is no evidence
that people lie on the Affidavits. 29  However, numerous
problems result from allowing a person to receive benefits by
simply signing a document stating he or she is married to a
University employee. Heterosexuals, both married and
unmarried, should be troubled to learn that signing an Affidavit
of Common-Law Marriage could create a marriage with all the
related legal obligations and responsibilities. 3 0 Any child born
during a marriage is presumed to be the natural child of the
125. Snetsinger, 27-29.
126. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief Montana Catholic Conference, Snetsinger (No.
03-238); Amicus Curiae Brief National Legal Foundation, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
127. Snetsinger, 21.
128. Samuel A. Marcosson, Romer and the Limits of Legitimacy: Stripping
Opponents of Gay and Lesbian Rights of Their 'Tirst Line of Defense" In the Same-Sex
tAu,,iuge Ei ht, 24"'. CONTEMP. T .1 a- elnno
129. Snetsinger, 123 (Rice, J., dissenting).
130. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-621.
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married couple. 131 This means that a man signing the Affidavit
to receive health insurance benefits would be married until
death or a formal divorce through the court, and would be the
presumed father of any child born during the "marriage."'132 It is
unlikely that couples who sign the Affidavit in order to receive
employee dependent benefits recognize they have accepted all
the associated responsibilities and obligations of marriage, as
well as its privileges.
One such marriage privilege is the ability of one spouse to
obtain health insurance for the other. The majority's ruling,
however, leaves doubt as to how entities should now determine
whether a common-law marriage existed or exists in order to
grant this privilege. The decision only clarifies that an
employment benefit policy cannot extend benefits to
heterosexual couples who, without more, sign an Affidavit of
Common-Law Marriage. 133 Whether agencies can continue to
rely upon such an affidavit to determine benefits or legal rights,
such as paternity, is unclear.1 34
Further, the exclusion of homosexuals from the Affidavit
procedure does not encourage the claimed state interest of
heterosexual marriage. 135  Even if it did, marriage is not
necessarily the institution society should be promoting.
Historically, marriage has been detrimental to women who,
upon entering it, lost their legal identity and were not permitted
to own property.1 36 It was once legal for husbands to beat ' 37 and
rape their wives.1 38 While opponents of same-sex marriage
continue to argue for the maintenance of the status quo of
marriage, they fail to acknowledge it as an institution that
historically has been very detrimental to those within its
confines.
In holding the Affidavits do not create a marriage, the court
is seemingly strengthening marriage by holding that the mere
signing of a piece of paper does not create a marriage, while
131. Id. § 40-6-105(1)(a).
132. Id.
133. Snetsinger, 35.
134. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105 (1)(a).
135. Appellants' Reply Brief at 5.
136. Amicus Curiae Brief Northwest Women's Law Center at 17-18, Snetsinger (No.
03-238) (citing Hemma Hill Kay, Symposium on Law in the Twentieth Century: From the
Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women's Rights and Family Law in the
United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017 (2000)).
137. Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156 (1824).
138. Frazier v. Texas, 86 S.W. 754, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905).
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simultaneously eroding one form of marriage which has a long
history in Montana. States recognizing common-law marriage
actually tend to be more stringent with the rules of marriage
than those states that do not recognize common-law marriage. 139
VI. BY AVOIDING THE ISSUES BEFORE IT, THE COURT PROVIDED
CONFUSION FOR STATE, FEDERAL AND PRIVATE ENTITIES
As mentioned previously, the other major problem with the
court's decision in Snetsinger is that it leaves state, federal and
private entities with confusion on how to determine benefits
based on marital status. Use of affidavits is a common practice
among state and federal agencies, particularly in determining
the distribution of public benefits. 140 Several state and federal
agencies rely upon an affidavit procedure, similar to that used
by the Montana University System in Snetsinger, where a
couple signs an affidavit or other document, stating they are
common-law married.14 1 The Affidavits merely list the three
elements necessary to establish a common-law marriage, and
the couple signs that all are present in their relationship. The
agencies then rely upon the representations made in the
Affidavits to determine the couple's eligibility for benefits based
on their marital status. For consistency, these affidavits or
other documents where an individual has represented his or her
marital status, are sometimes shared between agencies, such as
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) office and
the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED), which relies
upon the representations made in affidavits or other documents
to determine benefit eligibility and legal rights, such as parental
rights. For example, when a woman applying for TANF signs an
Affidavit of Common-Law Marriage, or otherwise represents she
is married, a presumption is created that her common-law
spouse is the father of all children born during the marriage. 142
It is now unclear whether this type of third-party or fourth-party
reliance is permissible due to the Snetsinger court's reasoning
that such an Affidavit does not create a marriage. If these
affidavits do not create a marriage, it is unclear whether there is
139. See, e.g., Hon. John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common-Law
Marriage: A Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law Marriage
Doctrine, 29 CUMB.L.REv. 399, 403 (1999).
141. Id.
142. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1)(a).
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any presumption of paternity.
The University System stated: "Surely the University
cannot be faulted for acting in a manner consistent with this
statutory presumption."'143  As the legislature statutorily
recognizes common-law marriage, 144 it would be inappropriate
for agencies to refuse to recognize such marriages. The
majority's reasoning, however, suggests such a result by noting
that those who wish to seek benefits based on marital status
should obtain either a solemnized marriage or file a declaration
of marriage. 145
The Snetsinger majority held "[c]ommon-law marriage in
Montana is an equitable doctrine used to ensure people are
treated fairly once a relationship ends."'146 The court further
noted that it has applied the doctrine of common-law marriage
only at the end of relationships, either by death or dissolution. 147
Justice Rice's dissent, however, cited cases where the court
applied the doctrine in instances where parties tried to avail
themselves of the privileges associated with marriage prior to
the end of the relationship. 148
Following the course the majority suggests eliminates the
doctrine of common-law marriage as it exists within the life of
such a marriage, since there is no way for the couple to establish
such a relationship prior to its end. However, all elements of a
common-law marriage must exist simultaneously. Therefore, it
hardly makes sense that a couple can only establish the
existence of a common-law marriage after its termination and
not before. If a couple can prove they were common-law married
upon the death of one of the partners, surely they should be able
to establish this relationship one week prior, if not earlier.
Snetsinger consistently follows Montana common-law
marriage case law-but Snetsinger was not a common-law
143. Respondents' Brief at 27, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
144. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-403.
145. Snetsinger, 34-35.
146. Id. 24.
147. Id.
148. Id. 139 (Rice, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 37, 318
Mont. 489, 37, 81 P.3d 488, 37 ("defendant seeking application of spousal privilege");
Howard v. Keohane, 898 F.Supp. 459 (E.D. Ky. 1995) ("couple seeking marital
communication rights within prison"); Scott v. Bd. of Trustees of Mobile S.S., 540 So.2d
657, 658 (Ala. 1988) ("couple seeking spousal welfare benefits"); National Sec. Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Minchew, 372 So.2d 327 (Ala. 1979) ("couple seeking to establish insurable
property interest by marriage").
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marriage case. 149 Rather, as the University System argued,
Snetsinger was a case of a state entity attempting to include all
"spouses" as defined by Montana's various marriage laws. 150
This is particularly difficult now because the definition of
marriage is the subject of state and national controversy, as
evidenced by the debate surrounding the recent amendment to
the Montana Constitution, to "define marriage,"'151 the national
debates concerning the Defense of Marriage Act, 152 and the
numerous court decisions and state legislation involving the
issue of same-sex marriage. 153
Snetsinger exemplifies a state entity attempting to
recognize all the various forms of marriage, albeit only all
heterosexual forms, and the court refusing to uphold this
attempt. It is unclear to what extent, if any, other agencies and
entities may continue to rely upon the use of Affidavits of
Common-Law Marriage. It would be impracticable, if not
impossible, for state, federal and private agencies, which handle
an enormous volume of cases, to perform a balancing test of
extrinsic evidence for every couple or individual who alleges
they are, or were, in a common-law marriage before determining
benefit eligibility.
VII. WHAT TO DO IN THE AFTERMATH OF SNETSINGER
A. Redefine "Family" to Accurately Reflect Today's Families
Snetsinger began the erosion of heterosexual privilege by
granting homosexual employees the same health benefit rights
as those enjoyed by heterosexual employees. In response to
Snetsinger, the Board of Regents unanimously voted to extend
dependent coverage under its health insurance plan to cover one
adult of an employee's choosing. 154 Under the new policy,
approved on March 18, 2005, "group health coverage can be
extended to one adult dependent of a university system
149. Snetsinger, 13; Appellants' Opening Brief at 3, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
150. Respondents' Brief at 2, 31-35, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
151. See MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7.
152. Pub. L. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (Sept. 21, 1996).
153. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. 186; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Romer, 517 U.S. 620;
Gryczan, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112; see also S.B. 202, 2005 Leg., 59th Sess. (Mont.
2005).
154. Regents Approve Same-Sex Insurance Policy, MISSOULIAN, Mar. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2005/03/18/mtracker/news/63policy.txt.
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employee at an additional premium of about $160 per month.' 5
The University System's revised policy now permits each
employee to include one adult as a dependent, irrespective of
whether this person is the employee's legal spouse, parent,
roommate, domestic partner, girlfriend, boyfriend, or sibling. 156
Permitting same-sex partners to obtain benefits likely will not
cost the University System any more money than what it
currently pays for health insurance. "Nearly two decades of
consistent actuarial studies . .. [show] that domestic partners
routinely cost less than spouses to insure, due principally to
same-sex couples' lower obstetric and pediatric costs.' 57
The University System's new policy marks the beginning of
redefining "family" in Montana, at a time when defining
relationships seems to be a popular activity. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held the right to define family to be a fundamental
right, prohibiting the state from "forcing all to live in certain
narrowly defined family patterns."'158 Redefining family, as the
University System's new policy will allow and will likely yield
consistency in benefit plans. Under the University System's
former policy, a heterosexual couple could simply sign an
Affidavit and receive benefits, 159 regardless of whether the
spouses shared a residence or maintained a common household.
Therefore, by remaining married, an employee could insure a
spouse who may live out-of-state, maintaining a separate
household. The married couple may in fact have had only
minimal contact for years, yet the University extended the
benefit of health insurance to this "spouse." The University
System's new policy should eliminate such inconsistencies while
extending benefits to those adults for whom its employees most
need to provide.
Redefining the family needs to extend beyond the health
insurance policy of the Montana University System. The denial
of marriage to an entire class of people by Constitutional
Initiative 96 does not mean homosexuals and same-sex domestic
partners have ceased to exist. Society needs to recognize the
existence of such relationships and understand that the
obligations and commitments between same-sex partners are
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Brief of Amicus Curie MEA/MFT at 3, Snetsinger (No. 03-238) (emphasis in
original).
158. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
159. Snetsinger, 33.
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the same as those between opposite-sex partners.
While statutory and constitutional provisions prevent
homosexuals from accessing the institution of marriage, 160
redefining the family will allow homosexuals to attain the same
benefits as are currently provided to heterosexuals. Redefining
the family, through the adoption of policies such as the
University System's new benefits policy, will allow institutions
to look at the make-up of individual families, rather than the
marital status, a classification which necessarily discriminates
against homosexuals. Redefining "family" will also more
accurately reflect all families of today. For example, the new
benefit plan will allow adult children to provide insurance for
their dependent parents, just as parents are eligible to provide
insurance for their dependent children. The "nuclear family"
consisting of a married man and woman with children no longer
pervades our society as it once did.
Federal, state and private entities should also begin to
redefine family to more accurately depict families of today,
which may actually strengthen families. Using the child
support system as an example, where a marriage, either formal
or common-law, has not been formally terminated, all children
born during the marriage are presumed the natural children of
the two parties to the marriage. 161 Although this is often an
accurate presumption, there are many instances when the
couple has been separated for years before the birth of a child
and the parties have had no contact, intimate or otherwise, with
each other during these years. The presumption of paternity
remains that the mother's husband is the father of all children
born while the couple is legally married, although basic high
school sex education would indicate otherwise. Even in cases
where the married couple continues to share a common
residence and perhaps intimate relations throughout the
gestation period of a child, the mother may sign child support
documents stating there is no way her husband fathered the
child. Again, sometimes common sense and a simple high school
genetics course show the husband could not father the child.
Under present Montana law, the husband remains the
presumptive father and child support is due from him.162 How
these policies and definitions of "family" strengthen marriage or
• v ,~l uA ii kil §7 vur. u . § 40-I-103.
161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1)(a).
162. Id.
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families is unclear.
Although the public policy behind child support is to ensure
that every child has two parents to provide care and support,
this is often an ill-fated goal that does not consider the needs of
the parents or the child. Where there is domestic violence,
collection of child support may not be in the best interest of the
either the child or the custodial parent who is the victim of the
violence. Where domestic violence is coupled with poverty, it
may be impossible to collect child support and may endanger the
health of the child and custodial parent. Applying a more
accurate definition of "family" in these cases would be beneficial.
In those instances, a "family" would only include one parent, and
the other parent would not be considered as part of the "family"
in any event. The abusing parent would not be sought out for
payment of arrears, and neither parent would be considered part
of the other parent's "family" for benefit determinations.
Perpetuating the benefits bestowed upon those who say "I
do," not only reinforces heterosexual privilege to the detriment
of homosexuals, it also traps domestic violence victims in
abusive relationships. Continuing to'lobby for defense of
marriage laws and similar legislation perpetuates the myth that
marriage is always a healthy relationship beneficial to society,
when that is not always the truth. This myth should not be
perpetuated.
"I submit that those championing the preservation-of-
marriage argument accord a good deal more to the sanctity of
the institution than do a substantial percentage of Montanans
and other Americans as evidenced by their actual conduct."'163
B. Future Litigation
The issue of legal class status based on sexual orientation
and the level of scrutiny to be applied to such classifications is
now ripe for decision. "The issue before the [Snetsinger] Court is
probably one of the most divisive in American society today."'164
Prior to Lawrence, litigators were forced to ignore homosexual
conduct (sexual relations between members of the same sex)
while arguing for equal protection. 16 5 However, since Lawrence
and Gryczan, this conduct has now been judicially sanctioned,
163. Snetsinger, 106 (Nelson, J., concurring).
164. Respondents' Brief at 3, Snetsinger (No. 03-238).
165. Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79
VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993).
Vol. 66
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 66 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/5
LOVE OR CONFUSION?
and the decisions support the extension of equal protection to
homosexuals as a class.
To begin the process of eradicating heterosexual privilege,
litigation and proposed legislation should focus on defining
homosexuals as a suspect class, requiring strict scrutiny
analysis for all legislation and policies based on sexual
orientation. Bills need to be drafted defining sexual orientation
as an immutable characteristic requiring strict scrutiny analysis
to be applied to policies and laws discriminating based on sexual
orientation. Proponents of equal rights need to continue to lobby
for the removal of the unconstitutional statute criminalizing
same-sex sexual contact from the Montana Code. 166 Until
society recognizes the immutability of sexual orientation,
litigation should focus on the fact that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is really based on sex, and therefore subject to
strict scrutiny analysis.
Justice Nelson's concurrence also suggests the Equal Rights
Clause and the dignity provision of the Montana Constitution
have not been fully utilized.16 7 By applying the human dignity
clause, which provides "the right to human dignity is
inviolable,"'168 laws and policies that classify people based on
sexual orientation would be unconstitutional due to their
interference with the fundamental right of human dignity.
169
This provision of the Montana Constitution should be used to
advocate for extending suspect class status to homosexuals and
to require that strict scrutiny be applied to laws and policies
that discriminate based on sexual orientation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although Snetsinger may be a small victory in the overall
scheme of civil rights, it could have gone further, while
remaining true to the issues defined by the litigants, if it had
determined the University System's policy illegally
discriminated based on sex. Doing so would have kept the court
from muddying the waters of common-law marriage. The
Snetsinger Petitioners expressly requested that the court grant
suspect class status to homosexuals and apply strict scrutiny
166. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505; see also Gryzcan, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d
112.
168. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
169. Snetsinger, 97 (Nelson, J., concurring).
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when analyzing laws and policies that discriminate based on
sexual orientation, as the University System's policy at issue
did. Because homosexuals satisfy all elements necessary for
suspect class status, the court should have granted them such
status. At the very least, the court should have determined that
classifications based on sexual orientation are actually sex-
based classifications and, as such, subject to strict scrutiny.
Through continued litigation and proposed legislation,
homosexuals may eventually be granted suspect class status and
recognized as deserving of all the rights and freedoms already
bestowed upon heterosexuals.
The University System's revised health insurance policy,
which allows for employees to purchase health insurance for one
other adult, is the beginning of redefining "family" to more
accurately reflect the make-up of today's families. They do not
consist of one woman, one man, one boy, one girl, a white picket
fence, two cars and one dog. As such, public policy should not be
based on such an erroneous model. The "traditional," nuclear
family is not the "family" that many people live in today.
Through the court system and legislatures, laws should be
changed to reflect the current notion of family, and allow people
the privacy and freedom to honestly choose the family they wish
to create.
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